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Three questions about Six fois deux
Gilles Deleuze
Cahiers du Cinéma has asked you for an interview, because 
you’re a “Philosopher” and we wanted to do something 
philosophical, but more specifically because you like and 
admire Godard’s work. What do you think of his recent TV 
programs?
Like many people, I was moved, and it’s a lasting emotion. 
Maybe I should explain my image of Godard. As someone who 
works a great deal, he must be a very solitary figure. But it’s not 
just any solitude, it’s an extraordinarily animated solitude. Full, 
not of dreams, fantasies, and projects, but of acts, things, people 
even. A multiple, creative solitude. From the depths of this 
solitude Godard constitutes a force in his own right but also gets 
others to work as a team. He can deal as an equal with anyone, 
with official powers or organizations, as well as a cleaning lady, 
a worker, mad people. In the TV programs, Godard’s questions 
always engage people directly. They disorient us, the viewers, 
but not whoever he’s talking to. He talks to crazy people in a way 
that’s no more that of a psychiatrist than of another madman, 
or of someone “playing the fool.” He talks with workers not 
as a boss, or another worker, or an intellectual, or a director 
talking with actors. It’s nothing to do with adopting their 
tone, in a wily sort of way, it’s because his solitude gives him 
a great capacity, is so full. It’s as though, in a way, he’s always 
stammering. Not stammering in his words, but stammering in 
language itself. You can normally only be a foreigner in another 
language. But here it’s a case of being a foreigner in one’s own 
language. Proust said that fine books have to be written in a 
sort of foreign language. It’s the same with Godard’s programs; 
he’s even perfected his Swiss accent to precisely this effect. It’s 
this creative stammering, this solitude, which makes Godard a 
force.
Because, as you know better than I do, he’s always been alone. 
Godard’s never had any popular success with his films, as those 
who say ‘he’s changed, from such and such a point onward it’s 
no good’ would have us believe. They’re often the very people 
who initially hated him. Godard was ahead of, and influenced, 
everyone, but not by being a success, rather by following 
his own line, a line of active flight, a repeatedly broken line 
zigzagging beneath the surface. Anyway, in cinema, they more 
or less managed to lock him into his solitude. They pinned 
him down. And now he’s used the opportunity presented by 
the holidays, and a vague demand for creativity, to take over 
the TV for six times two programs. It may be the sole case of 
someone not being duped by TV. You’ve usually lost from the 
outset. People wouldn’t have minded him promoting his films, 
but they can’t forgive him for making this series that changes 
so many things at the heart of TV (ques tioning people, making 
them talk, showing images from a variety of sources, and so on) 
. Even now it’s over, even if it’s been stifled. Many groups and 
associations were bound to get annoyed: the statement from 
the Union of Photographic Journalists and Cameramen is a 
good example. Godard has at the very least stirred up hatred. 
But he’s also shown that a differently “animated” TV is possible.
You haven ‘t answered our question. Say you had to give a 
“course ” on these programs… What ideas did you see, 
or sense in them? How would you try to explain your 
enthusiasm? We can always talk about everything else 
afterward, even if it’s what ‘s most important.
OK, but ideas, having an idea, isn’t about ideology, it’s a practical 
matter. Godard has a nice saying: not a just image, just an image. 
Philosophers ought also to say ‘not the just ideas, just ideas’ 
and bear this out in their activity. Because the just ideas are 
always those that conform to accepted meanings or established 
precepts, they’re always ideas that confirm something, even if it’s 
something in the future, even if it’s the future of the revolution. 
While ‘just ideas’ is a becoming-present, a stammering of ideas, 
and can only be expressed in the form of questions that tend to 
confound any answers. Or you can present some simple thing 
that disrupts all the arguments.
There are two ideas in Godard’s programs that work this way, 
constantly encroaching on one another, getting mixed up and 
teased apart bit by bit. This is one reason why each program 
has two parts: as at primary school there are the two elements 
of learning about things and learning about language. The first 
idea is to do with work. I think Godard’s constantly bringing 
into question a vaguely Marxist scheme that has spread 
everywhere: there’s supposed to be something pretty abstract 
called “labor” that one can buy or sell, in situations that either 
mark a basic social injustice or establish a little more social 
justice. But Godard asks very concrete questions, he presents 
images touching on what exactly is being bought and sold. What 
are some people prepared to buy, and others to sell, these not 
necessarily being the same thing? A young welder is prepared 
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to sell his work as a welder, but not his sexuality by becoming 
an old woman’s lover. A cleaning lady’s happy to sell the time 
she spends cleaning but won’t sell the moment she spends 
singing a bit of the “Internationale”, why? Because she can’t 
sing? But what, then, if one were to pay her for talking about 
not being able to sing? A specialist clockmaker, on the other 
hand, wants to get paid for his clockmaking efforts, but refuses 
to be paid for his work as an amateur filmmaker, which he calls 
his “hobby”; but the images show that the movements he makes 
in the two activities, the clockmaking sequence and the editing 
sequence, are so remarkably similar that you can mistake 
one for the other. But no, says the clockmaker, there’s a great 
difference of love and warmth in these movements, I don’t want 
to be paid for my filmmaking. But then what about filmmakers 
and photographers who do get paid? What, furthermore, is 
a photographer himself prepared to pay for? He’s sometimes 
prepared to pay his model. Sometimes the model pays him. But 
when he photographs torture or an execution, he pays neither 
the victim nor the executioner. And when he photographs 
children who are sick, wounded, or hungry, why doesn’t he pay 
them? Guattari once suggested at a psychoanalytical congress 
that analysands should be paid as well as analysts, since 
the analyst isn’t exactly providing a “service,” it’s more like a 
division of labor, two distinct kinds of work going on: there’s 
the analyst’s work of listening and sifting, but the analysand’s 
unconscious is at work too. Nobody seems to have taken much 
notice of Guattari’s suggestion. Godard’s saying the same 
thing: why not pay the people who watch television, instead of 
making them pay, because they’re engaged in real work and are 
themselves providing a public service? The social division of 
labor means it’s not only work on the shop floor that gets paid 
but work in offices and research laboratories too. Otherwise 
we’d have to think about the workers themselves having to pay 
the people who design the things they make. I think all these 
questions and many others, all these images and many others, 
tear apart the notion of labor. In the first place, the very notion 
of labor arbitrarily sets one area of activity apart, cuts work off 
from its relation to love, to creativity, to production even. It 
makes work a kind of maintenance, the opposite of creating 
anything, because on this notion it’s a matter of reproducing 
goods that are consumed and reproducing its own productive 
force, within a closed system of exchange. From this viewpoint 
it doesn’t much matter whether the exchange is fair or unfair, 
because there’s always selective violence in an act of payment, 
and there’s mystification in the very principle of talking in terms 
of labor. It’s to the extent that work might be distinguished from 
the productive pseudoforce of labor that very different flows 
of production, of many disparate kinds, might be brought 
into direct relation with flows of money, independently of any 
mediation by an abstract force.
I’m even more confused than Godard. Just as I should be, since 
the key thing is the questions Godard asks and the images he 
presents and a chance of the spectator feeling that the notion of 
labor isn’t innocent, isn’t at all obvious –even, and particularly, 
from the viewpoint of social criticism. It’s this, quite as much 
as the more obvious things, that explains the reactions of the 
Communist Party and some unions to Godard’s pro grams: he’s 
dared to question that sacrosanct notion of labor… And then 
there’s the second idea, to do with information. Because here 
again, language is presented to us as basically informative, and 
information as basically an exchange. Once again, information 
is measured in abstract units. But it’s doubtful whether the 
schoolmistress, explaining how something works or teaching 
spelling, is transmitting information. She’s instructing, she’s 
really delivering precepts. And children are supplied with syntax 
like workers being given tools, in order to produce utterances 
conforming to accepted meanings. We should take him quite 
literally when Godard says children are political prisoners. 
Language is a system of instructions rather than a means of 
conveying information. TV tells us: ‘Now we’ll have a bit of 
entertainment, then the news…’ We ought in fact to invert the 
scheme of information theory. The theory assumes a theoretical 
maximum of information, with pure noise, interference, at 
the other extreme; and in between there’s redundancy, which 
reduces the information but allows it to overcome noise. But we 
should actually start with redundancy as the transmission and 
relaying of orders or instructions; next, there’s information-
always the minimum needed for the satisfactory reception of 
orders; then what? Well, then there’s something like silence, or 
like stammering, or screaming, something slipping through 
underneath the redundancies and information, letting language 
slip through, and making itself heard, in spite of everything. To 
talk, even about yourself, is always to take the place of someone 
else in whose place you’re claiming to speak and who’s been 
denied the right to speak. Orders and precepts stream from 
seguy’s open mouth. But the woman with the dead child is 
open-mouthed too. An image gets represented by a sound, like 
a worker by his representative. A sound takes over a series of 
images. So how can we manage to speak without giving orders, 
without claiming to represent something or someone, how can 
we get people without the right to speak, to speak; and how can 
we restore to sounds their part in the struggle against power? I 
suppose that’s what it means to be like a foreigner in one’s own 
language, to trace a sort of line of flight for words.
That’s “just” two ideas, but two ideas is a lot, it’s massive, 
includes loads of things and other ideas. So Godard brings into 
question two everyday notions, those of labor and information. 
He doesn’t say we should give true information, nor that labor 
should be well paid (those would be the just ideas) . He says 
these notions are very suspect. He writes FALSE beside them. 
He’s been saying for ages that he’d like to be a production 
THREE QUESTIONS ABOUT SIX FOIS DEUX
14 Cinema Comparat/ive Cinema · Vol. III · no. 7 · 2015
company rather than an auteur, and to run the television news 
rather than make films. He didn’t of course mean he wanted 
to produce his own films, like Verneuil, or take over TV. But 
that he wanted to produce a mosaic of different work rather 
than measuring it all against some abstract productive force, 
and wanted to produce a sub-informational juxtaposition of all 
the open mouths instead of relating them all to some abstract 
information taken, as a precept.
If those are Godard’s two ideas, do they correspond to the 
theme of “sounds and images” that constantly recurs in the 
programs? Images-learning from things-relating to work, 
and sounds-learning the language-relating to information?
No, there’s only a partial correspondence: there’s always 
information in images, and something at work in sounds. 
Any set of terms can and should be divided up in various 
ways that correspond only partially. To try and articulate the 
relation between sounds and images as Godard understands it 
you’d have to tell a very abstract story, in several episodes, and 
then finally see that this abstract story corresponds to a single 
episode of something terribly simple and concrete.
1 . There are images, things are themselves images, because 
images aren’t in our head, in our brain. The brain’s just one 
image among others. Images are constantly acting and reacting 
on each other, producing and consuming. There’s no difference 
at all between images, things, and motion.
2. But images also have an inside or certain images have an 
inside and are experienced from inside. They’re subjects (cf. 
Godard’s remarks on Two or Three Things I Know About Her 
in Godard on Godard, pp. 239-42) . And there’s a gap between 
actions upon these images and the reactions they produce. 
It’s this gap that enables them to store up other images, that 
is to perceive. But what they store is only what interests them 
in other images: perceiving is subtracting from an image what 
doesn’t interest us, there’s always Less in our perception. We’re 
so full of images we no longer see those outside us for what 
they are.
3. There are also aural images, which don’t seem to have any 
priority. Yet these aural images, or some of them, have an other 
side you can call whatever you like, ideas, meaning, language, 
expressive aspects, and so on. Aural images are thus able to 
contract or capture other images or a series of other images. A 
voice takes over a set of images (the voice of Hitler, say) . Ideas, 
acting as precepts, are embodied in aural images or sound 
waves and say what should interest us in other images: they 
dictate our perception. There’s always a central “rubber stamp” 
normalizing images, subtracting what we’re not supposed to see. 
So, given the earlier gap, we can trace out as it were two converse 
currents: one going from external images to perceptions, the 
other going from prevailing ideas to perceptions.
4. So we’re caught in a chain of images, each of us in our own 
particular place, each ourself an image, and also in a network 
of ideas acting as precepts. And so what Godard’s doing with 
his ”words and images” goes in two directions at once. On the 
one hand he’s restoring their fullness to external images, so we 
don’t perceive something less, making perception equal to the 
image, giving back to images all that belongs to them-which is 
in itself a way of challenging this or that power and its rubber 
stamps. On the other hand, he’s undoing the way language takes 
power, he’s making it stammer in sound waves, taking apart any 
set of ideas purporting to be just ones and extracting from it 
just some ideas. These are perhaps two reasons among others 
why Godard makes such novel use of the static shot (“plan 
fixe”). It’s rather like what some contemporary musicians do 
by introducing a fixed aural plane so that everything in music 
is heard. And when Godard puts a blackboard on the screen 
and writes on it, he’s not making it something he can film 
but making the blackboard and writing into a new televisual 
resource, a sort of expressive material with its own particular 
current in relation to the other currents on the screen.
This whole abstract story in four episodes sounds a bit like 
science fiction. But it’s our social reality these days. The 
strange thing is that the story corresponds in various ways to 
what Bergson said in the first chapter of Matter and Memory. 
Bergson’s seen as a sedate old philosopher who’s no longer of 
any interest. It would be good if cinema or television revived 
interest in him (he should be on the IDHEC syllabus, maybe 
he is). The first chapter of Matter and Memory develops an 
amazing conception of the relations between photography and 
cinematic motion, and things: ‘photography, if there is such 
a thing as photography, is caught from the outset in, drawn 
from the start right into the interior of things, and this at 
every point in space,’ and so on. That’s not to say Godard’s a 
Bergsonian. It’s more the other way around; Godard’s not even 
reviving Bergson, but finding bits of Bergson along his way as 
he revivifies television.
But why does everything in Godard come in twos? You need 
two to get three… Fine, but what are these twos and threes 
all about?
Oh, come on, you know better than anyone it’s not like that. 
Godard’s not a dialectician. What counts with him isn’t two or 
three or however many, it’s AND, the conjunction AND. The 
key thing is Godard’s use of AND. This is important, because 
all our thought’s modeled, rather, on the verb “to be,” IS. 
Philosophy’s weighed down with discussions about attributive 
judgments (the sky is blue) and existential judgments (God 
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is) and the possibility or impossibility of reducing one to the 
other. But they all turn on the verb “to be.” Even conjunctions 
are dealt with in terms of the verb “to be” – look at syllogisms. 
The English and the Americans are just about the only people 
who’ve set conjunctions free, by thinking about relations. But 
when you see relational judgments as autonomous, you realize 
that they creep in everywhere, they invade and ruin everything: 
And isn ‘t even a specific conjunction or relation, it brings in 
all relations, there are as many relations as ands, and doesn’t 
just upset all relations, it upsets being, the verb… and so on. 
And, ‘and… and… and…’ is precisely a creative stammering, 
a foreign use of language, as opposed to a conformist and 
dominant use based on the verb “to be.”
And is of course diversity, multiplicity, the destruction of 
identities. It’s not the same factory gate when I go in, and when 
I come out, and then when I go past unemployed. A convicted 
man ‘s wife isn’t the same before and after the conviction. But 
diversity and multiplicity are nothing to do with aesthetic 
wholes (in the sense of “one more,” “one more woman”…) or 
dialectical schemas (in the sense of “one produces two, which 
then produces three”). Because in those cases it’s still Unity, 
and thus being, that’s primary, and that supposedly becomes 
multiple. When Godard says everything has two parts, that in 
a day there’s morning and evening, he’s not saying it’s one or 
the other, or that one becomes the other, becomes two. Because 
multiplicity is never in the terms, however many, nor in all the 
terms together, the whole. Multiplicity is precisely in the “and,” 
which is different in nature from elementary components and 
collections of them.
Neither a component nor a collection, what is this AND? I 
think Godard’s force lies in living and thinking and presenting 
this AND in a very novel way, and in making it work actively. 
AND is neither one thing nor the other, it’s always in between, 
between two things; it’s the borderline, there’s always a border, 
a line of flight or flow, only we don’t see it, because it’s the least 
perceptible of things. And yet it’s along this line of flight that 
things come to pass, becomings evolve, revolutions take shape. 
‘The strong people aren’t the ones on one side or the other, power 
lies on the border.’ Giscard d’Estaing made a sad observation in 
the lecture on military geography he recently gave the army: 
the more that things become balanced at the level of the largest 
groups, between West and East, u.s. and USSR, with planetary 
consensus, link-ups in space, global policing, and so on, the 
more they become “destabilized” between North and South – 
Giscard cites Angola, the Near East, the Palestinian resistance, 
but also all the unrest that produces ‘a regional destabilization 
of security,’ airplane hijacking, Corsica . . . Between North 
and South we’ll keep on finding lines that derail the big 
groups, an AND, AND, AND which each time marks a new 
threshold, a new direction of the broken line, a new course for 
the border. Godard’s trying to “see borders,” that is, to show 
the imperceptible. The convict and his wife. The mother and 
child. But also images and sounds. And the clockmaker’s 
movements when he’s in his clockmaking sequence and when 
he’s at his editing table: an imperceptible border separates 
them, belonging to neither but carrying both forward in their 
disparate development, in a flight or in a flow where we no 
longer know which is the guiding thread, nor where it’s going. 
A whole micropolitics of borders, countering the macropolitics 
of large groups. At least we know that’s where things come to 
pass, on the border between images and sounds, where images 
become too full and sounds too strident. That’s what Godard’s 
done in Six Times Two: made this active and creative line pass 
six times between them, made it visible, as it carries television 
forward.
Originally published as ‘Trois questions sur Six fois deux’ 
in ‘Cahiers du cinéma’ no. 271. (nov. 1976). English version 
found in ‘Gilles Deleuze: Negotiations 1972-1990’ (Columbia 
University Press, 1995), translated by Martin Joughin.
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